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brief historical overview of the industry’s development, its unfortunate consequences for 
Baton Rouge, the state capital, and that city’s largely unsuccessful efforts to deal with 
them. Detailed and rigorous examinations of the industry’s impact on the larger region’s 
human and fish populations are the subjects, respectively, of Barbara Allen’s and H. L. 
Bart’s essays. 
Transforming New Orleans and Its Environs, essentially an historical environmental 
impact statement of the settlement and development of a region of the Deep South, is also 
a fine example of institutional economic history. Its editor and contributors are to be com­
mended. 
PAUL PASKOFF, Louisiana State University 
Northern Naval Superiority and the Economics of the American Civil War. By David G. 
Surdam. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2001. Pp. xxiv, 286. $34.95. 
The contribution of the blockade to Union victory during the American Civil War has 
long been controversial. Among those historians who have questioned the blockade’s 
efficacy are Richard E. Beringer, Herman Hattaway, Archer Jones, William N. Still Jr., 
Raimondo Luraghi, Frank Lawrence Owsley, and Stephen R. Wise. They note that, until 
the war’s last year, the blockade remained a leaky sieve and that the agrarian South never 
lost a major battle for lack of arms and ammunition. The blockade’s scholarly advocates, 
including Edwin B. Coddington, Bern Anderson, and Stanley Lebergott, stress in contrast 
such indirect impacts as the disruption of internal trade, the over-taxing of southern rail­
roads, and the dislocation of the Confederate economy overall. 
Economic historian David Surdam has waded into this debate with a boldly conceived, 
valuable book employing more explicit theoretical models and greatly expanded data. Not 
confining himself to the blockade alone, Surdam makes four interrelated arguments: First, 
the blockade of southern ports imposed heavy burdens on the Confederacy at very low cost 
to the Union. Second, the blockade also precluded Confederate wielding of its near monop­
oly position in the international market for cotton. Third, the world demand for American 
cotton, contrary to previous findings, was not “destined for a severe downturn, whether 
temporary or permanent” (p. 150). Fourth, Union policies relating to cotton in occupied 
areas and trade across the lines weakened somewhat the blockade’s effectiveness. None of 
these points, save the third, is entirely original, but Surdam’s book certainly pumps up their 
quantitative muscle. 
Surdam pursues the first argument by comparing the blockaded South with an ideal 
Confederate war effort facing no military barriers to trade with Europe or to transport 
over inland and coastal waterways. He is therefore able to corroborate Coddington’s 
thesis that the blockade was responsible for the universally acknowledged wartime 
breakdown of the South’s railways. Astronomically higher shipping costs and reduced 
tonnage—despite the continued success of blockade runners—also prevented construc­
tion of a Confederate navy, deprived civilians of many imported necessities, brought a 
region self-sufficient in foodstuffs to the verge of starvation, and thereby proved instru­
mental in undermining morale. 
On the one hand, Surdam is to be applauded for his emphasis on logistics, a subject often 
neglected in straight military accounts. No study does a better job of showing exactly why 
Union control of the Mississippi River was so debilitating for the Confederacy. The author 
has mastered a vast secondary literature on two usually disparate subjects: military and 
economic history. And he has profitably revisited some classic but musty academic discus­
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sions, such as that over southern food supplies originally sparked by Douglass North’s 
1961 work on antebellum interregional trade. 
On the other hand, the author of Northern Naval Superiority and the Economics of the 
Civil War is guilty of overstatement when he claims that “the blockade alone might have 
rendered asunder the nascent Confederacy . . . [,] albeit more slowly” (p. 186). As he 
proceeds through his laundry list of all the great things that could have been accomplished 
without the Union blockade, Surdam seems to lose sight of other constraints the Confeder­
ate war effort would have hit, due to limited southern resources. It is not at all clear that 
even the increased revenue from optimal cotton exports could have purchased enough iron 
both to maintain southern railroads at full throttle and build a Confederate navy rivaling 
that of the Union. Moreover, Surdam counts as part of the blockade many combined naval-
land operations that the Union would have mounted anyway for other military reasons. As 
the book’s evidence demonstrates, the capture of New Orleans in April 1862 was the most 
devastating single blow to Confederate foreign commerce and intraregional trade. How 
much of the Union’s control over rivers and the oceans should be credited to the blockade 
as opposed to mere naval superiority, the importance of which no one denies? The detrac­
tors always admitted that the blockade inhibited the Rebel war effort at the margin. To 
prove that the blockade would have been decisive, Surdam must pay greater attention to 
similar conflicts, where a combatant successfully withstood equally overwhelming naval 
disadvantages, for instance the Americans during either the Revolution or the War of 1812. 
Perhaps the book’s most interesting revision relates to wartime cotton demand. Whereas 
the previous estimates of Gavin Wright and John R. Hanson II assumed a constant elastic­
ity, Surdam presents compelling evidence that the demand elasticity for American cotton 
not only changed over time but was not even constant at any one time, instead becoming 
more elastic at higher prices. This insight unfortunately works at slight cross purposes with 
Surdam’s simultaneous endorsement of Lebergott’s suggestion that the Confederacy could 
have exploited its price-setting power over cotton. Not that the tension matters much. A 
careful look at Surdam’s figures shows that any enhanced revenue from output restrictions 
would have been almost trivial compared to the revenue lost from the blockade-induced 
wedge between cotton prices in the Confederacy and in Europe. 
The book’s major weakness is its presentation. Not simply does the author write with the 
impenetrable prose that characterizes too much of cliometrics, but he apparently had no 
clear notion about his intended audience. The allocation of material between text and 
appendices displays no obvious consistency. Some very technical economics remain within 
the text to befuddle any Civil War historian untutored in the subject. Yet Surdam fails to 
provide sufficient historical details about such relatively obscure topics as the Confederate 
cotton embargo or Union cotton policies for economists not experts in the period. As a 
result, Northern Naval Superiority and the Economics of the American Civil War will have 
trouble reaching the two groups most interested in its conclusions. Surdam’s editors at the 
University of South Carolina Press must share some of the blame for these unfortunate 
blemishes on what is otherwise a fine addition to Civil War scholarship. 
JEFFREY ROGERS HUMMEL, Hoover Institution 
Indian Reservations in the United States: Territory, Sovereignty and Economic Change. By 
Klaus Frantz. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999. Pp. xxvi, 370. $25.00, paper. 
As its title indicates, American Indian reservations are the subject of this book. In partic­
ular, this book deals with issues pertaining to the economic conditions of federally recog­
